2019 Advanced Noncooperative Game Theory

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Academic unit or major
Graduate major in Industrial Engineering and Economics
Instructor(s)
Kawasaki Ryo 
Course component(s)
Lecture
Day/Period(Room No.)
Mon7-8(西9号館, 508号室)  Thr7-8(西9号館, 508号室)  
Group
-
Course number
IEE.B403
Credits
2
Academic year
2019
Offered quarter
2Q
Syllabus updated
2019/3/20
Lecture notes updated
2019/7/26
Language used
English
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Course description and aims

This course covers the elementary topics in noncooperative game theory. These topics include (1) games in strategic form, dominated strategies, Nash equlibrium; (2) potential games and supermodular games; (3) games in extensive form, subgame-perfect equilibrium, sequential equilibrium, and trembling-hand perfect equilibrium; and (4) repeated games; (5) games with incomplete information.

In recent years, game theory has been extensively used in theoretical economics. This course is intended to provide students with knowledge of noncooperative game theory for application to complex economic systems.

Student learning outcomes

By taking this course, students will have developed the following skills:
1) Build an economic model using advanced noncooperative game theory
2) Calculate Nash equilibria, subgame-perfect equilibria, sequential equilibria, etc. of games given in strategic form and extensive form.
3) Think logically and explain complex social phenomenon using game theory
4) Read theoretical academic papers that use noncooperative game theory.

Keywords

Games in strategic form, Nash equilibrium, potential games, supermodular games, games in extensive form, subgame-perfect equilibrium, sequential equilibrium, trembling-hand perfect equilibrium

Competencies that will be developed

Intercultural skills Communication skills Specialist skills Critical thinking skills Practical and/or problem-solving skills
- - - -

Class flow

This course will be held in lecture form. If time allows, some exercise problems will be explained.

Course schedule/Required learning

  Course schedule Required learning
Class 1 Definition of a strategic form game, dominated strategies Details will be given in each lecture.
Class 2 Iterated removal of dominated strategies
Class 3 Nash equilibrium
Class 4 The proof of the existence of Nash equilibrium
Class 5 Potential games
Class 6 Monotone comparative statics
Class 7 Supermodular games
Class 8 Review of Lectures 1-7 and midterm exam
Class 9 Rigorous definition of games in extensive form
Class 10 Subgames and subgame-perfect equilibrium
Class 11 Repeated games and the Folk Theorem
Class 12 Perfect Bayesian equilibrium, sequential equilibrium, trembling-hand perfect equilibrium
Class 13 Games with incomplete information (1) - Bayesian games, Bayesian Nash equilibrium
Class 14 Games with incomplete information (2) - Applications
Class 15 Review of Lectures 9-14

Textbook(s)

No textbook. Lecture notes will be uploaded on the OCW-i page.

Reference books, course materials, etc.

Okada, A. Game Theory (New Edition) Tokyo: Yuhikaku, 2011. (Japanese)
Vega-Redondo, F. Economics and the Theory of Games. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.
Mas-Colell, A., M. Whinston, and J. Green. Microeconomic Theory. New York: Oxford University Press, 1995.

Assessment criteria and methods

Homework (approximately 30%), midterm exam (approximately 30%), final exam (approximately 40%)

Related courses

  • IEE.B401 : Advanced Microeconomics
  • IEE.B402 : Advanced Macroeconomics
  • IEE.B404 : Advanced Cooperative Game Theory
  • IEE.B405 : Advanced Econometrics
  • IEE.B431 : Advanced Topics in Microeconomics

Prerequisites (i.e., required knowledge, skills, courses, etc.)

Knowledge of undergraduate level of game theory is required.

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