This course covers the elementary topics in noncooperative game theory. These topics include (1) games in strategic form, dominated strategies, Nash equlibrium; (2) potential games and supermodular games; (3) games in extensive form, subgame-perfect equilibrium, sequential equilibrium, and trembling-hand perfect equilibrium; and (4) repeated games; (5) games with incomplete information.
In recent years, game theory has been extensively used in theoretical economics. This course is intended to provide students with knowledge of noncooperative game theory for application to complex economic systems.
By taking this course, students will have developed the following skills:
1) Build an economic model using advanced noncooperative game theory
2) Calculate Nash equilibria, subgame-perfect equilibria, sequential equilibria, etc. of games given in strategic form and extensive form.
3) Think logically and explain complex social phenomenon using game theory
4) Read theoretical academic papers that use noncooperative game theory.
Games in strategic form, Nash equilibrium, potential games, supermodular games, games in extensive form, subgame-perfect equilibrium, sequential equilibrium, trembling-hand perfect equilibrium
|✔ Specialist skills||Intercultural skills||Communication skills||Critical thinking skills||Practical and/or problem-solving skills|
This course will be held in lecture form. If time allows, some exercise problems will be explained.
|Course schedule||Required learning|
|Class 1||Definition of a strategic form game, dominated strategies||Details will be given in each lecture.|
|Class 2||Iterated removal of dominated strategies|
|Class 3||Nash equilibrium|
|Class 4||The proof of the existence of Nash equilibrium|
|Class 5||Potential games|
|Class 6||Monotone comparative statics|
|Class 7||Supermodular games|
|Class 8||Definition of games in extensive form|
|Class 9||Subgames and subgame-perfect equilibrium|
|Class 10||Repeated games and the Folk Theorem|
|Class 11||Perfect Bayesian equilibrium, sequential equilibrium, trembling-hand perfect equilibrium|
|Class 12||Games with incomplete information (1) - Bayesian games, Bayesian Nash equilibrium|
|Class 13||Games with incomplete information (2) - Applications|
|Class 14||Review of Lectures 1-14|
To enhance effective learning, students are encouraged to spend approximately 100 minutes preparing for class and another 100 minutes reviewing class content afterwards (including assignments) for each class.
They should do so by referring to textbooks and other course material.
No textbook. Lecture notes will be uploaded on the OCW-i page.
Okada, A. Game Theory (New Edition) Tokyo: Yuhikaku, 2011. (Japanese)
Vega-Redondo, F. Economics and the Theory of Games. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.
Mas-Colell, A., M. Whinston, and J. Green. Microeconomic Theory. New York: Oxford University Press, 1995.
Homework (approximately 30%), final exam (approximately 70%)
Knowledge of undergraduate level of game theory is required.