2020 Noncooperative Game Theory

Font size  SML

Register update notification mail Add to favorite lecture list
Academic unit or major
Undergraduate major in Industrial Engineering and Economics
Fukuda Emiko 
Course component(s)
Mode of instruction
Day/Period(Room No.)
Tue7-8(W933)  Fri7-8(W933)  
Course number
Academic year
Offered quarter
Syllabus updated
Lecture notes updated
Language used
Access Index

Course description and aims

This course covers the elementary topics in non-cooperative game theory. These topics include (1) games in strategic form, dominated strategies, Nash equilibrium; (2) games in extensive form and subgame-perfect equilibrium; (3) repeated games and the Folk Theorem; and (4) evolutionary game theory.

In everyday life, people interact with each other. Game theory is a mathematical tool used in analyzing the interaction among rational decision makers. Its applications range throughout many topics in economics and management, and by applying this theory, additional insights may emerge. The objective of this course is for students to be able to apply the theory when examining topics of their interest in economics and industrial engineering.

Student learning outcomes

By taking this course, students will have attained the following skills:
1) Build an economic model using non-cooperative game theory.
2) Calculate Nash equilibria, subgame-perfect equilibria, etc. of games given in strategic form and extensive form.
3) Think logically and explain social phenomenon using game theory.


Games in strategic form, Nash equilibrium, games in extensive form, subgame-perfect equilibrium, Bayesian games, Perfect Bayesian equilibrium, evolutionary game theory

Competencies that will be developed

Specialist skills Intercultural skills Communication skills Critical thinking skills Practical and/or problem-solving skills

Class flow

This class will be held in lecture form. If time allows, some exercise problems will be explained.

Course schedule/Required learning

  Course schedule Required learning
Class 1 Games in strategic form (1) - Definition of a game, game in (bi)matrix form, dominated strategies Details will be given in each lecture.
Class 2 Games in strategic form (2) - Zero-sum games, maximin strategies, minimax strategies, Minimax Theorem
Class 3 Games in strategic form (3) - Rationalizable strategies, best response, Nash equilibrium
Class 4 Games in strategic form (4) - Review, applications
Class 5 Games in extensive form (1) - Game tree, information set, strategy
Class 6 Games in extensive form (2) - Subgame, Subgame-perfect equilibrium, games with perfect information, backwards induction
Class 7 Games in extensive form (3) - Applications, games with imperfect information
Class 8 Review of Lectures 1-7, midterm evaluation
Class 9 Repeated games (1) - Finitely repeated games, component games, strategies in repeated games
Class 10 Repeated games (2) - Infinitely repeated games, Folk Theorem
Class 11 Games with incomplete information (1) - Incomplete information, Bayesian games, types, Bayesian-Nash equilibrium
Class 12 Games with incomplete information (2) - Perfect Bayesian equilibrium, belief, consistency, sequential rationality
Class 13 Games with incomplete information (3) - Adverse selection, signaling, screening
Class 14 Evolutionary game theory - Basic concepts, evolutionary stable strategies (ESS), applications

Out-of-Class Study Time (Preparation and Review)

To enhance effective learning, students are encouraged to spend approximately 100 minutes preparing for class and another 100 minutes reviewing class content afterwards (including assignments) for each class.
They should do so by referring to textbooks and other course material.


Muto, S. Introduction to Game Theory. Tokyo: Nikkei Publishing Inc., 2001. (Japanese)

Reference books, course materials, etc.

Funaki, Y. Exercises in Game Theory. Tokyo: Saiensu-sha Co. Ltd. Publishers, 2004. (Japanese)
Muto, S. Game Theory. Tokyo: Ohmsha, 2011. (Japanese)
Greve, T. Non-Cooperative Game Theory. Tokyo: Chisen-shokan, 2011. (Japanese)

Assessment criteria and methods

Homework (approximately 30%), Midterm evaluation and Final exam (approximately 35% each).

Related courses

  • IEE.B201 : Microeconomics I
  • IEE.B202 : Microeconomics II
  • IEE.B206 : Experimental Economics
  • IEE.B302 : Cooperative Game Theory
  • IEE.A201 : Basic Mathematics for Industrial Engineering and Economics

Prerequisites (i.e., required knowledge, skills, courses, etc.)

No prerequisites.

Page Top