This course covers the elementary topics in non-cooperative game theory. These topics include (1) games in strategic form, dominated strategies, Nash equilibrium; (2) games in extensive form and subgame-perfect equilibrium; (3) repeated games and the Folk Theorem; and (4) evolutionary game theory.
In everyday life, people interact with each other. Game theory is a mathematical tool used in analyzing the interaction among rational decision makers. Its applications range throughout many topics in economics and management, and by applying this theory, additional insights may emerge. The objective of this course is for students to be able to apply the theory when examining topics of their interest in economics and industrial engineering.
By taking this course, students will have attained the following skills:
1) Build an economic model using non-cooperative game theory.
2) Calculate Nash equilibria, subgame-perfect equilibria, etc. of games given in strategic form and extensive form.
3) Think logically and explain social phenomenon using game theory.
Games in strategic form, Nash equilibrium, games in extensive form, subgame-perfect equilibrium, Bayesian games, Perfect Bayesian equilibrium, evolutionary game theory
|✔ Specialist skills||Intercultural skills||Communication skills||Critical thinking skills||Practical and/or problem-solving skills|
This class will be held in lecture form. If time allows, some exercise problems will be explained.
|Course schedule||Required learning|
|Class 1||Games in strategic form (1) - Definition of a game, game in (bi)matrix form, dominated strategies||Details will be given in each lecture.|
|Class 2||Games in strategic form (2) - Zero-sum games, maximin strategies, minimax strategies, Minimax Theorem|
|Class 3||Games in strategic form (3) - Rationalizable strategies, best response, Nash equilibrium|
|Class 4||Games in strategic form (4) - Review, applications|
|Class 5||Games in extensive form (1) - Game tree, information set, strategy|
|Class 6||Games in extensive form (2) - Subgame, Subgame-perfect equilibrium, games with perfect information, backwards induction|
|Class 7||Games in extensive form (3) - Applications, games with imperfect information|
|Class 8||Review of Lectures 1-7, midterm evaluation|
|Class 9||Repeated games (1) - Finitely repeated games, component games, strategies in repeated games|
|Class 10||Repeated games (2) - Infinitely repeated games, Folk Theorem|
|Class 11||Games with incomplete information (1) - Incomplete information, Bayesian games, types, Bayesian-Nash equilibrium|
|Class 12||Games with incomplete information (2) - Perfect Bayesian equilibrium, belief, consistency, sequential rationality|
|Class 13||Games with incomplete information (3) - Adverse selection, signaling, screening|
|Class 14||Evolutionary game theory - Basic concepts, evolutionary stable strategies (ESS), applications|
Muto, S. Introduction to Game Theory. Tokyo: Nikkei Publishing Inc., 2001. (Japanese)
Funaki, Y. Exercises in Game Theory. Tokyo: Saiensu-sha Co. Ltd. Publishers, 2004. (Japanese)
Muto, S. Game Theory. Tokyo: Ohmsha, 2011. (Japanese)
Greve, T. Non-Cooperative Game Theory. Tokyo: Chisen-shokan, 2011. (Japanese)
Homework (approximately 30%), Midterm evaluation and Final exam (approximately 35% each).