This course offers graduate-level mathematically rigorous theory of non-cooperative games. The topics to be covered include: strategic form games, extensive form games, Nash equilibrium and its refinements such as subgame perfect equilibrium, perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium, sequential equilibrium, perfect equilibrium, etc. Letures will be given in English.
This course is designed for students wishing firm foundation in noncooperative game theory.
2 Basic Elements of Non-cooperative Games I（Ch.7）
3 Basic Elements of Non-cooperative Games II（Ch.7）
4 Simultaneous-Move Games I（Ch.8）
5 Simultaneous-Move Games II（Ch.8）
6 Simultaneous-Move Games III（Ch.8）
7 Simultaneous-Move Games IV（Ch.8）
8 Simultaneous-Move Games V（Ch.8）
10 Dynamic Games I（Ch.9）
11 Dynamic Games II（Ch.9）
12 Dynamic Games III (Ch.9)
13 Dynamic Games IV (Ch.9)
15 Dynamic Games V (Ch.9)
Mas-Colell,A. et al. (1995), Microeconomic Theory, Oxford University Press
Knowledge of undergraduate level non-cooperative game theory is required.
Homework Assignments (40%) and a final exam (60%)
Students are encouraged to attend the TA session for better understanding of homework problems.