This course offers graduate-level mathematically rigorous theory of non-cooperative games. The topics to be covered include: strategic form games, extensive form games, Nash equilibrium and its refinements such as subgame perfect equilibrium, perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium, sequential equilibrium, perfect equilibrium, etc. Letures will be given in English.
This course is designed for students wishing firm foundation in noncooperative game theory.
April 7 (Thurs.) Introduction
April 14(Thurs.) Basic Elements of Non-cooperative Games I(Ch.7)
April 21(Thurs.) Basic Elements of Non-cooperative Games I(Ch.7)
April 29(Fri.) Simultaneous-Move Games I(Ch.8)
May 5(Thurs.) Simultaneous-Move Games II(Ch.8)
May 12(Thurs.) Simultaneous-Move Games III(Ch.8)
May 19(Thurs.) Simultaneous-Move Games IV(Ch.8)
May 26(Thurs.) Dynamic Games I(Ch.9)
June 2(Thurs.) Dynamic Games II(Ch.9)
June 9(Thurs.) Dynamic Games III (Ch.9)
June 16(Thurs.) Dynamic Games IV
June 23(Thurs.) Dynamic Games V
June 30 (Thurs.) Exercises
July 7(Thurs.) Exercises
July 14(Thurs.) Final Exam
Mas-Colell,A. et al. (1995), Microeconomic Theory, Oxford University Press
Knowledge of undergraduate level non-cooperative game theory is required.
Homework (40%) and a final exam (60%)
Students are encouraged to attend the TA session for better understanding of homework problems.