講義概要

This course offers graduate-level mathematically rigorous theory of non-cooperative games. The topicd to be covered include: strategic form games, extensive form games, Nash equilibrium and its refinement such as subgame perfect equilibrium, perfect Bayesian Nas equilibrium, sequential equilibrium, perfect equilibrium, etc. Von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility theory on uncertain events will also be covered. Letures will be given in English.

講義の目的

This course offers graduate-level mathematically rigorous theory of non-cooperative games. The topicd to be covered include: strategic form games, extensive form games, Nash equilibrium and its refinement such as subgame perfect equilibrium, perfect Bayesian Nas equilibrium, sequential equilibrium, perfect equilibrium, etc. Von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility theory on uncertain events will also be covered. Letures will be given in English.

講義計画

April 8 (Thurs.) Basic Elements of Non-cooperative Games I（Ch.7）
April 15（Thurs.） Basic Elements of Non-cooperative Games I（Ch.7）
April 22（Thurs.） Simultaneous-Move Games I（Ch.8）
April 29（Thurs.）　（Holiday）
May 6（Thurs.） Simultaneous-Move Games II（Ch.8）
May 13（Thurs.） Simultaneous-Move Games III（Ch.8）
May 20（Thurs.） Simultaneous-Move Games IV（Ch.8）
May 27（Thurs.） Dynamic Games I（Ch.9）
June 3（Thurs.） Dynamic Games II（Ch.9）
June 10（Thurs.） Dynamic Games III（Ch.9）
June 17（Thurs.） Choice under Uncertainty I（Ch.6(6.A, 6.B)）
June 24（Thurs.） Choice under Uncertainty I（Ch.6(6.A, 6.B)）
July 1（Thurs.） Choice under Uncertainty I（Ch.6(6.A, 6.B)）
July 8（Thurs.） Exercises
July 15（Thurs.） Study week
July 22（Thurs）　（No class - Monday classes）

教科書・参考書等

Mas-Colell,A. et al. (1995), Microeconomic Theory, Oxford University Press

成績評価

Homework and a final exam

担当教員の一言

Students are encouraged to attend the TA session for better understanding of homework problems.